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THE DEMISE OF SUMMARY PREJUDGMENT
REMEDIES IN CALIFORNIA
Until recently, two widely used summary procedures-claim and
delivery, and prejudgment attachment-provided speedy and efficient
remedies for California creditor-plaintiffs. Simply defined, claim and
delivery was a process whereby a plaintiff in an action for the possession
of personal property could gain the immediate possession of that prop-
erty prior to any hearing.' Prejudgment attachment, on the other
hand, was a creditor remedy available to plaintiffs in actions upon
unsecured contracts; by this procedure the plaintiff could have any
property of the defendant, except wages, frozen pending the outcome
of the action.2 Both of these procedures were recently found uncon-
stitutional as violative of due process by the California Supreme Court
in Blair v. Pitchess' and Randone v. Appellate Department of the
Superior Court.
4
Blair and Randone have expanded a trend in California court deci-
sions which has been marked by a decline in the emphasis attached to
speedy debt collection procedures and by a concomitant increase in the
emphasis given to the due process "right to be heard" prior to any
material deprivation.5 This trend has focused attention upon the hard-
ship created by the threat or exercise of summary creditor remedies which
fail to provide the debtor with an opportunity for a hearing before his
property is taken or attached.
Formerly, all of the debtor's property, except wages,6 were subject
to claim and delivery or attachment. The availability of such exten-
1. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 509-21 (West 1954), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
2. Id. § 537(1) (West Supp. 1971). Prejudgment attachment is also available
in contract actions where the defendant is a nonresident or absent from the state, id. §
537(2); in tort actions where the defendant is a nonresident or absent from the state, id.
537(3); in unlawful detainer actions where the rent is unsecured, id. § 537(4); in an ac-
tion by the state for the collection of taxes or other moneys due, id. § 537(5); in an ac-
tion by the state for recovery of funds expended in narcotics investigations, id. § 537
(6). Certain of these applications of the procedure may also be of questionable
validity. See text accompanying notes 148-57 infra.
3. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
4. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
5. See Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d. 125, 83 Cal. Rptr.
669 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1970); Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971); Mihans v.
Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F.
Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
6. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 537 (West Supp. 1971).
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sive creditor remedies provided great leverage to the creditor in dealing
with a debtor over an alleged debt. The very threat to use these rem-
edies could persuade the debtor to agree to an out of court settlement,
even though he might have a meritorious defense,7 rather than risk the
loss of his property even for a limited time. While both Blair and
Randone acknowledged that the legislature might enact enforceable
replacement remedies,' they held that in all except extraordinary cases
due process requires that a debtor must be given notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before his property is subject to claim and delivery
or prejudgment attachment.
This note will analyze the application by the California court, of
recent United States Supreme Court decisions regarding procedural
due process and will outline the present limits of due process in Cali-
fornia set forth in Blair and Randone. The note will also discuss the
application of these due process requirements to possible replacement
legislation and to other prejudgment remedies not at issue in the two
decisions.
The Sniadach Rule: Elaboration of Procedural
Due Process
Both Blair and Randone were avowedly delivered under the im-
petus and within the rationale of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.9
In Sniadach a creditor, the Family Finance of Wisconsin, instituted a
garnishment action against Mrs. Sniadach as defendant and her em-
ployer as garnishee. The complaint alleged $420 owing on a promis-
sory note. The employer, as garnishee, answered that he had wages
of $63.18 earned by the defendant within his control, and that, in ac-
cordance with the Wisconsin wage garnishment statute, 1" he would
pay out half that amount to the employee as a subsistence allowance
and hold the other half subject to the order of the court. The employee
moved that the summary garnishment proceedings be dismissed on the
grounds that they were violative of due process. The lower court up-
held the statute and its decision was affirmed by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court." On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the
decision was reversed.
12
7. E. JACKSON, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE § 9.2, at 153 (Cal.
Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1968).
8. See text accompanying notes 134-45 infra.
9. 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court,
5 Cal. 3d 536, 547, 488 P.2d 13, 23, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 719 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess,
5 Cal. 3d 258, 279, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 56 (1971).
10. Wis. STAT. §§ 267.04, 267.18(2)(a) (1965), as amended, WIs. STAT. §§
267.04, 267.18(2)(a) (1969).
11. Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
12. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
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Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that while there
may be "extraordinary situations" which warrant such summary pro-
cedures, there was "no situation requiring special protection to a state
or creditor interest" in the present case, nor was the Wisconsin statute
narrowly drawn to apply only to such "extraordinary situations."' 3
Justice Douglas concluded:
Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no ex-
tended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hear-
ing. . . this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fun-
damental principles of due process.
14
The lack of "extended argument" by the court has caused some
difficulty in assessing the limits of Sniadach.'5 Justice Douglas pointed
out that wages were a "specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system,"'16 but he did not expressly limit the
decision to cases involving wages. He noted the "tremendous hard-
ship" imposed on employees in situations like Sniadach,'7 but he did
not state that notice and a prior hearing were required by due process
solely where a taking would cause tremendous hardship. Justice Har-
lan, in a concurring opinion, suggested that "tremendous hardship"
was not a factor in determining whether procedural due process had
been violated.
The "property" of which petitioner has been deprived is the use
of the garnished portion of her wages during the interim period be-
tween the garnishment and the culmination of the main suit. Since
this deprivation cannot be characterized as de minimis, she must
be accorded the prerequisites of due process: notice and a prior
hearing.'8
The Broadening of Sniadach
The Supreme Court handed down three major due process deci-
sions"0 subsequent to Sniadach invalidating prejudgment deprivations.
Although the facts in all three cases were clearly distinguishable from
those in Sniadach, the decisions were premised on the same standards of
procedural due process which had been applied in Sniadach. While it
has been contended by some that the Sniadach principles of procedural
due process were limited to situations involving the deprivation of
13. Id. at 339.
14. Id. at 342.
15. See generally Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 942
(1970).
16. 395 U.S. at 340.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
19. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
20. Western Bd. of Adjusters, Inc. v. Covina Publishing, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d 659,
674, 88 Cal. Rptr. 293, 302 (1970).
February 19721
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
wages, 20 the position can be fairly taken that these three post-Sniadach
decisions have expanded the application of Sniadach to areas unrelated to
wages. This development in the law of procedural due process casts a
different light upon certain language in Sniadach. While Justice Douglas
wrote there of the peculiar nature of wages as a property interest, his ob-
servations now seem less a basis for decision, but rather a recognition of
the hardship caused by summary deprivation of any significant interest.
To the extent that the brief discussion of wages in Sniadach has been
viewed by some as limiting that holding, the inclusion of that discussion
seems unfortunate.
The first case, Goldberg v. Kelly,21 held that prior to the termina-
tion of welfare benefits, due process required that a recipient be af-
forded notice and an evidentiary hearing, and also that he be given the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses with the assistance
of counsel if so desired. Unlike Sniadach, Goldberg dealt with welfare
benefits, not earned wages. Furthermore, a state interest-avoiding
unwarranted expenditure of funds-rather than a private creditor in-
terest was advanced to justify the summary deprivation. Neverthe-
less, the Court found that these differences did not affect the root re-
quirement of due process that an opportunity to be heard be afforded
before any significant deprivation be allowed to take place.
The second case, Boddie v. Connecticut,22 guaranteed access to
divorce courts for those who could not afford the fees. The Court
used broad language in a general discussion of the principle that due
process requires notice and a hearing before the deprivation of any sig-
nificant interest, unless there is a countervailing state or creditor in-
terest of overriding significance. 23  Unlike Sniadach the thrust of Bod-
die was not directed toward an examination of the nature of the prop-
erty or interest which was threatened with deprivation without a prior
hearing. Rather, the court grounded the decision primarily on the de-
privation of the right to be heard. The court reasoned as follows.
Although the interest at stake was the dissolution of a marriage, that in-
terest could only be furthered by judicial proceedings. Therefore,
when a filing fee effectively denied judicial access to an impoverished
spouse, an interest was denied without an opportunity to be heard. The
Court found this situation violative of due process.
Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires, at a minimum,
that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.2
4
21. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
23. Id. at 377-79.
24. Id. at 377.
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Importantly, the Court found Sniadach and Goldberg supportive
of this position, without reference to the fact that wholly distinguishable
interests of the litigants were threatened;25 common to the cases was
the deprivation of the opportunity to be heard.
In short, "within the limits of practicability," . . . a State must
afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it
is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process Clause.26
Perhaps the strongest evidence that Boddie extended the Sniadach
concept of procedural due process is the fact that Justice Douglas, the
author of the Sniadach opinion, felt compelled to concur separately.
27
His argument was that the decision in Boddie should have rested on
equal protection grounds alone, rather than add to the "elastic" nature
of the due process clause."8  Only Justice Douglas voiced this opinion,
however, and only Justice Black dissented from the result.
Finally, in Bell v. Burson.,29 using Sniadach as direct authority, the
Court invalidated a state procedure which forced an uninsured motorist
involved in an accident to put up a security bond or lose his driver's
license. Such a procedure was found to violate procedural due process
unless there was a prior hearing on the probable validity of the claim
against him. In Bell, the threatened interest was the privilege to drive
a car, an interest wholly dissimilar to wages or welfare benefits. Never-
theless, the Court found the procedural due process requirements of
Sniadach, Goldberg, and Boddie applicable; except in extraordinary
situations, a person cannot be deprived of a significant interest without
a prior opportunity to be heard.
In light of Goldberg, Boddie, and Bell, then, it would appear
that the procedural due process requirements as enunciated in Sniad-
ach are not restricted to cases in which the interim use of wages is
threatened. Rather, when there is a threatened taking which is "sig-
nificant,"30 not "de minimis,"31 and if there is no countervailing in-
terest of sufficient weight to justify a relaxation of due process require-
ments, 32 a person is entitled to notice and a hearing before the taking.
McCallop and Cline: Beginning of a Trend
With the companion cases of McCallop v. Carberry33 and Cline
25. Id. at 377 n.3.
26. Id. at 379.
27. Id. at 383-86.
28. Id. at 384.
29. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
30. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
31. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
32. Id. at 339 (Douglas, J.).
33. 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
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v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley,34 California began to imple-
ment the due process principles of Sniadach. In the former case, Mc-
Callop's wages were garnished pursuant to an action to collect an al-
leged debt of $63 8. 1 Subsequently, McCallop brought suit for declara-
tory and injunctive relief from the garnishment. The trial court held,
under the authority of Sniadach, that California's prejudgment wage
garnishment statutes were violative of due process, and the California
Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
The wage garnishment statutes attacked in McCallop differed in
certain respects from those found unconstitutional in Sniadach.
Wisconsin provided for notice to the alleged debtor within ten days
after service upon the garnishee- after the wages were frozen. 6  In
California, an alleged creditor had to serve the defendant with a copy
of the summons and the complaint in the action to recover on the al-
leged contractual debt before garnishment, or give notice eight days
in advance that his wages were to be garnished. Furthermore, the
California statutes allowed a more generous subsistence allowance than
did those of Wisconsin .
3
Despite the distinguishing features of the California procedure in
McCallop, the court found Sniadach controling. The essential
similarity of the Wisconsin and California procedures was that both
provided for deprivation of a part of a wage earner's income without
first affording him an opportunity to be heard. The court based its
holding upon the possible hardship inherent in such a deprivation of the
wage earner's income, the lack of extraordinary circumstances to war-
rant such a procedure, and the failure of the statute to limit its operation
to such extraordinary situations. 9
In Cline, another wage garnishment case, the wage earner also
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In this case, however, the
creditors had only threatened wage attachment. Initially, the suit was
dismissed in the trial court for failure to state a cause of action. During
the appeal stages of Cline, Sniadach was decided, and the California
Supreme Court, in reliance on Sniadach, granted Cline's relief in a
companion decision with McCallop.
34. 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970).
35. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 537(1) (West 1954), as amended, (Supp. 1971);
Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1540, § 1, at 3124, as amended, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690.6
(Supp. 1971) (amended to exempt wages).
36. Wis. STAT. § 267.07(1) (1969).
37. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1540, § 1, at 3124 (repealed 1970).
38. In California attachment could not exceed 50% of wages owing, Cal. Stat.
1963, ch. 1540, § 1, at 3124, as amended, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 690.6 (Supp. 1971),
while in Wisconsin the subsistence allowance could not exceed 50% of the wages,
Wis. STAT. § 267.18(2)(a) (1965), as amended, WIs. SIAT. § 267.18(2)(a) (1969).
39. 1 Cal. 3d at 904-07, 464 P.2d at 123-24, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68.
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Since both McCallop and Cline dealt with wage garnishment, the
cases can be considered directly in point with Sniadach. In light of
the more lenient exemption provision in the California statute, the hard-
ship aspect in the two cases must be viewed as even less severe than
that in Sniadach.40 There was no language in either opinion, however,
which would suggest an extension of Sniadach beyond wage garnish-
ment.4 '
Other California courts were faced with constitutional attacks based
on the authority of Sniadach against various prejudgment remedies.
Some of these attacks met with a holding that Sniadach stood only for
the proposition that wages could not be withheld from a wage earner
before he had an opportunity to be heard.42  Three courts, however,
found that the due process requirement of an opportunity for a hearing
prior to a significant deprivation was operative in situations other
than where wages were involved.43  Those decisions finding Sniadach
principles applicable to cases unrelated to wage garnishment, coupled
with the brief but definite decisions in McCallop and Cline, marked the
beginning of a judicial trend in California which Blair and Randone
greatly expanded."
40. See notes 36-38 & accompanying text supra.
41. In fact, the same day McCallop and Cline were banded down, the court re-
fused to render an "advisory opinion" on the constitutionality of prejudgment attach-
ment. People v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 910, 464 P.2d 126, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670
(1970).
42. Western Bd. of Adjusters, Inc. v. Covina Publishing, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d
659, 674, 88 Cal. Rptr. 293, 302 (1970); Johnston v. Cunningham, 12 Cal. App. 3d
123, 128, 90 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490 (1970). Both cases involved an attack on the same
procedure invalidated in Randone.
43. All three cases involved attacks on various landlord remedies, and all in-
volved deprivations prior to hearings. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal.
1970); Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971); Mihans v.
Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970). In Klim, California
Civil Code § 1861 (West 1954), as amended, (West Supp. 1971), was found con-
trary to the Sniadach requirement of a hearing before a significant deprivation by
allowing an innkeeper's lien on personal property without first affording a tenant a
right to be heard. Gray found that California Code of Civil Procedure § 1174 (West
1955), as amended, (West Supp. 1971), failed to meet the requirements of procedural
due process by allowing a landlord to sell property left by a tenant in premises re-
covered through a wrongful detainer action. Mihans found that California Code of
Civil Procedure § 1166a (West 1955), as amended, (West Supp. 1971), was violative
of procedural due process because it provided for a significant deprivation without first
guaranteeing a hearing. The statute granted a plaintiff in an action for unlawful de-
tainer the right to gain a writ of immediate possession if it appeared that the tenant
was insolvent. All three cases involved the loss of a significant interest, and all three
decisions found that that interest need not be wages to warrant the requirement of a
prior bearing.
44. Blair and Randone were preceded by much speculation as to the applicability
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Blair v. Pitchess: Claim and Delivery
The Basic Claim and Delivery Process
Claim and delivery, the prejudgment replevin procedure attacked
in Blair, was available to any "plaintiff in an action to recover the pos-
session of personal property. . ... -" Such a plaintiff could seek to in-
yoke the procedure at the time of the issuance of summons, or at any
time before answer.4 6 After filing his complaint, a plaintiff filed an
affidavit with the county sheriff's or marshal's office, stating that he
owned or was entitled to the possession of certain personal property,
and that the defendant was wrongfully detaining the property.17  The
creditor or other plaintiff was required to file an undertaking of
two or more sufficient sureties for twice the value of the property,48
and the sheriff, marshal, or constable of the county was then authorized
to seize the property. If the property was inside a building, the officer
was to publicly demand its delivery, and, if the property was not
delivered, "he [was to] cause the building or inclosure to be broken
open, and take the property into his possession; if necesary, he [could]
call to his aid the power of the county."49  After seizure the defendant
could state his objections to the plaintiffs sureties,50 or could file under-
takings similar to those of the plaintiff for return of the property. 51 After
the peace officer seized the property, he was to deliver it to the plaintiff
upon payment of fees and expenses52 and file the undertaking, affidavit,
and other relevant documents with the clerk of the court in which the
action was pending. 3
of Sniadach to replevin and attachment procedures. See, e.g., Note, Laprease and
Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUm. L. Rav. 886 (1971); Note, The Consti-
tutional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837 (1970).
45. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 509 (West. 1954).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 510. Also required were allegations of the reason for the wrongful
detention, and allegations that the property had not been taken for tax assessment, fine,
or seized by attachment or execution. The plaintiff was also to allege the value of the
property.
48. Id. § 512 (West Supp. 1971). This section also provides for immediate
delivery to the defendant of a copy of the affidavit.
49. Id. § 517 (West 1954).
50. Id. § 513. If the defendant excepted to the sureties, he had to state such
objections within two days of service of a copy of the affidavit and undertaking, or
he had waived them.
51. Id. § 514. But if the defendant had objected to the plaintiff's surties, he
could not employ this recovery procedure. In any case, the defendant had to employ
this procedure before the sheriff had delivered the goods to the plaintiff.
52. Id. § 518. Id. § 521 provides: "After the property has been delivered to
the plaintiff . . . the court shall . . . protect the plaintiff in the possession of said
property until the final determination of the action."
53. Id. § 520 (West Supp. 1971).
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Because of the expense to the creditor in employing claim and
delivery proceedings, this was often the last resort in attempting to col-
lect payment from an alleged debtor. 54  The threat of such proceed-
ings, however, obviously added leverage to the creditor's demand for
settlement from the debtor. A debtor faced with the reality of im-
mediate loss of perhaps indispensable property, as well as the airing of
his financial problems before the public and other creditors, might be
more amenable to reaching a settlement with the creditor, even to the
extent of foregoing a meritorious defense to the creditor's claim."'
If the threatened procedure was carried out, then the debtor would
at least be temporarily deprived of the use of his property, and if the
property was essential to the household or livelihood of the debtor,
"[t]he seizure of such goods '[could] as a practical matter drive a wage-
earning family to the wall.' "56
The Blair Decision
In November 1968, Blair and certain others brought a taxpayer's
suit against Sheriff Pitchess and Marshal Keays of Los Angeles County
to enjoin an alleged illegal expenditure of public funds.57 The plain-
tiffs contended that the claim and delivery statutes were illegal, and, as
administered, required salaried public employees to violate certain pro-
visions of the United States and California Constitutions.
58
Following the filing of defendants' answer, plaintiffs moved for
and were granted summary judgment by the trial court. The defend-
ants, their agents and deputies were enjoined from doing any of the fol-
lowing:
(1) taking any personal property unless the alleged debtor has
first been afforded an opportunity to be heard in a judicial pro-
ceeding . . . (2) entering, for the purpose of searching for and
taking any personal property, any private dwelling . . . or any
other location which could not be entered without a search war-
rant if the entry therein was for [criminal investigative] purposes
. . . unless the alleged creditor [or law enforcement officers] prior
to such entry. . . establish before a magistrate that there is prob-
able cause to believe that the property is on the premises . . .
54. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 278, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 56 (1971).
55. E. JACKSON, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE 153 (Cal. Cont. Educ.
Bar ed. 1968).
56. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 279, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 57 (1971), quoting Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
57. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 526a (West 1954), as amended, (West Supp.
1971) provides: "An action to obtain a judgment, restraining . . . any illegal expendi-
ture of ... funds... of a county .. may be maintained against any officer thereof
58. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV § 1; CAL. CONST. art 1, §§ 13, 19.
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and that the alleged creditor has the right to the immediate posses-
sion thereof.59
The defendants appealed from the trial court's ruling, and the
court of appeal reversed." ° Since claimants had personally paid fees
to avail themselves of claim and delivery, the appellate court found that
the plaintiffs could not maintain a taxpayers' action because there
had been no expenditure of public funds. The court concluded that
since the plaintiffs lacked standing as taxpayers, they were merely seek-
ing an advisory opinion which was not within the province of the Cali-
fornia courts.6 '
Although the finding of the court of appeal that plaintiffs had no
standing to sue was dispositive of the appeal, the court also questioned
the propriety of the plaintiffs' attempt to apply search and seizure and
due process restrictions to the claim and delivery procedure. 62  A peti-
tion for rehearing was denied, and the plaintiffs in the original action
sought and were granted a hearing by the California Supreme Court.
Justice Sullivan, speaking for the court in Blair, first found that
the plaintiffs came within the standing requirements of a taxpayers'
suit,63 and therefore presented a "case or controversy."6 " The court
then proceeded, in a unanimous and sweeping opinion, to find that
while "there may be exceptional situations in which creditor or state in-
terests justify claim and delivery procedure or in which consent to such
procedure is validly obtained, '65 the statutes as written failed to meet
the constitutional standards of search and seizure 6 and procedural due
process.
6 7
Even though claim and delivery provided for an official entry by
a police officer, the fact that it was a civil proceeding had apparently
saved it from attack on search and seizure grounds; recent decisions
have affected this immunity. The Supreme Court has held that Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are
not necessarily restricted to criminal situations;"s neither do they ex-
59. Blair v. Pitchess, No. 942, 966 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 12, 1969) (final order
entered Nov. 25, 1969), rev'd, 91 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Ct. App. 1970), vacated, 5 Cal. 3d
258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
60. Blair v. Pitchess, 91 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Ct. App. 1970), vacated, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
61. Id. at 354-56.
62. Id. at 356-57.
63. See note 57 supra.
64. 5 Cal. 3d at 268-69, 486 P.2d at 1248-50, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 48-50.
65. Id. at 282, 486 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
66. ld. at 272-3, 486 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
67. Id. at 277, 486 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
68. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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tend to all entries of a civil nature. 9 In Camara v. Municipal Court,70
the Supreme Court found that the lessee of an apartment building could
not be prosecuted for failure to permit a warrantless inspection of his
premises by representatives of a housing authority. The court did note,
however, that "most citizens allow inspections of their property with-
out a warrant," and that as a result, warrants would be necessary only
after entry has been refused. 71 In Wyman v. James7 2 a welfare recipi-
ent contended that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a
requirement that she allow welfare officials into her home, or else lose
her benefits. The Court here found that a warrant was not necessary
for such entries. Camara was thought to be distinguishable on the basis
that there a prosecution which followed the denial of entry, while in
Wyman there were no criminal sanctions and the welfare recipient
could prevent entry although it would result in a loss of aid.73 In view
of the fact that the claim and delivery procedure provided for a forcible
entry if entry were denied, 4 it appears proper, under Camara, to require
a warrant.
In Blair the court held that search and seizure protections were ap-
plicable in civil matters unless the entry was primarily for the benefit of
those whose homes were invaded, and if such persons could be allowed
to refuse such entry without fear of criminal sanctions.7 5 Since claim
and delivery procedures did not come within the above exceptions, and
there had been no showing of probable cause, the court held that the
statutes violated the Fourth Amendment .76
Contracts for the sale of goods often include clauses granting the
seller the right to repossess upon default by the buyer, when payments
are to be made in installments.77 Such contractual "assent" to an en-
try and taking by a peace officer has been given conclusive weight by
other jurisdictions in attacks on replevin statutes. 78 However, the statu-
tory authority to enter under the California claim and delivery proce-
dures did not depend on such contractual assent, and the statute, there-
69. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
70. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
71. Id. at 539-40.
72. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
73. Id. at 324-25.
74. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
75. 5 Cal. 3d at 258, 486 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
76. Id.
77. The generally included clause is: "Upon default, the seller may enter any
premises where the personal property may be and take possession thereof." E. JAcK-
soN, CALiroRN.A DEBT CoLLECnoN PRACTCE 230 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1968).
78. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970);
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 958 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S.
906 (1971).
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fore, did not offer the debtor freedom from nonconsensual entry.
Moreover, even if the statute had provided entry only where contrac-
tual assent existed, the Blair court inferred that contracts containing
such assent would in most instances be deemed to be "adhesion con-
tracts, ' 79 and would be held unenforceable.
For substantially the same reason that consent is ineffective to
waive Fourth Amendment rights if made under the intimidation im-
plicit in the presence of a uniformed officer of the law . . or ex-
plicit in threats of reprisal . a consent obtained in such a con-
tract of adhesion is ineffective to waive the constitutional protec-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures.80
While it was noted in Camara that warrants for housing authority in-
spections would probably only be sought only where entry was denied,
Blair went further by finding that the presence of a uniformed law offi-
cer realistically prevented a resident from denying entry. Therefore,
there was no suggestion in Blair that authorities seeking entry under
claim and delivery provisions needed warrants only after entry was de-
nied.
Blair then proceeded to apply the due process principles of Sniad-
ach to the claim and delivery procedures, and found that seizure prior
to any opportunity for a hearing was violative of due process." It
should be noted that Blair was not the first attack based on Sniadach
against replevin remedies. Two federal courts had previously taken
a contrary position to Blair and found that Sniadach was not applicable
to replevin statutes. However, both cases relied heavily on contractual
assent to repossession. -82  The third federal court to consider the ques-
tion found that Sniadach was applicable, and reached a result similar
to Blair.3  Thus under the Sniadach rationale, a hearing prior to de-
privation is requisite unless there are extraordinary circumstances.8 '
Defendants in Blair argued that claim and delivery was necessary to
protect the creditor from an absconding buyer. The court brushed
aside this contention by noting that claim and delivery was infrequently
utilized by creditors because of the expense involved, and, more impor-
tantly, telephone calls, personal visits, letters and other measures of
communication with the debtor are normally made before resort to
claim and delivery. 5 Thus a debtor with a predilection for flight
79. 5 Cal. 3d at 275, 486 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 54; see note 66 supra.
80. Id. at 276, 486 P.2d at 1254-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55.
81. Id.
82. See note 78 supra.
83. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722-24 (N.D.N.Y.
1970) (finding New York replevin procedure which permitted prehearing seizure un-
constitutional).
84. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
85. 5 Cal. 3d at 278, 486 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (1971); E. JACKSON,
CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRAcTIcE 28-32 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1968).
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would seldom wait for the sheriff.86 Clearly, it would be possible for a
creditor to demonstrate that a debtor was about to abscond in a par-
ticular instance, but the inherent dificiency in the claim and delivery
statute was that it did not restrict its operation only to instances where
there was such a showing.
As in Sniadach the potential hardship caused a debtor by claim
and delivery was pointed out, but the Blair court did not indicate that
"tremendous hardship" was necessary before a prior hearing was re-
quired by due process.87 The court concluded that since claim and de-
livery provided for a taking prior to a hearing and was not restricted
to extraordinary situations, the result was a violation of due process. 8
Defendants' contention that due process rights were often waived by
contract was treated in the same manner as the purported contractual
waiver of search and seizure rights.8 9
In summary, the court held: (1) there can be no entry and seiz-
ure of personal property -unless supported by a warrant issued by a mag-
istrate upon a showing of probable cause to believe that plaintiff was
entitled to certain named property which was on the named premises;9
(2) there can be no taking such as provided under the claim and de-
livery procedures without a prior hearing, unless there are "weighty
state or creditor interests" sufficient to amount to the Sniadach-de-
scribed "extraordinary situation."91  Because the claim and delivery
procedure did not require warrants for the entries which it authorized,
and because no attempt was made to limit the application of the proce-
dure to extraordinary situations or situations where the alleged debtor
had been given an opportunity to be heard, the procedure failed to meet
the requirements of Blair's decision.
Randone: Prejudgment Attachment
Prejudgment Attachment
The statute attacked in Randone provided for the attachment of a
defendant's property in any
action upon a contract, express or implied, for the direct payment
of money, (a) where the contract is made or is payable in this
86. But cf. Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645, 657 (D. Md. 1971), "mhe
contention that surprise, and therefore seizure before a hearing, is necessary to pro-
tect the interests of the seller . . . cannot be dismissed as frivolous."
87. 5 Cal. 3d at 279, 486 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 291, 486 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 58; see text accompanying
notes 77-80 supra.
90. Id. at 273, 486 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
91. Id. at 278, 486 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 56. For a discussion of "ex-
traordinary circumstances" see accompanying notes 116-26 infra.
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state; or (b) where the contract is made outside this state and is not
payable in this state and the amount of the claim based upon such
contract exceeds five thousand dollars .... 92
The attachment of the property could be made at the time of issuing the
summons, or at any time afterward.93 To obtain the writ of attach-
ment, the plaintiff was required to file a declaration with the clerk of
the court in which the action was pending, stating that the contract
complied with the statutory requirements for bringing the action. 4
The plaintiff was also required to file an undertaking for at least one-
half of the total indebtedness claimed, or one-half of the value of the
property sought to be attached. 95 Once the clerk received these papers,
he was authorized to issue the writ of attachment, which was forwarded
to the sheriff for levy. 6  Unlike claim and delivery, the property at-
tached was not turned over to the plaintiff; however, since it remained
under the control of the sheriff, its use was still lost to the defendant.
California has recognized the possible hardship created by such a
procedure, and has developed a series of exemption statutes.97  How-
ever, no property except the wages of the defendant are precluded from
attachment initially,9" and to qualify for protection under an exemp-
tion provision, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to establish
his exemption. 99 Some deprivation is therefore inevitable, even if the
defendant subsequently succeeds in having the attachment lifted.
The Randone Decision
Mr. and Mrs. Randone had allegedly failed to pay a bill for $490
for services rendered by a Sacramento law firm, and the law firm had
assigned the debt to a collection agency. In February 1970, the collec-
tion agency, as assignee, filed an action against the Randones to collect
the amount due under the contract. One month later, pursuant to the
prejudgment attachment statute,1"' the agency secured a writ of attach-
92. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 537.1 (West Supp. 1971). The procedure was
available for unsecured transactions, or secured transactions where the security had be-
come valueless. An action by a spouse for support and maintenance was deemed on
an implied contract for purposes of the statute.
93. Id. § 537.
94. Id. § 538. The amount of indebtedness claimed was to be set out; no claim
for under $200 could support the attachment procedure.
95. Id. § 539. If the defendant won on the merits, or if the attachment was
improper under California Code of Civil Procedure section 537, the defendant was
entitled to any damages sustained by reason of the attachment.
96. Id. §§ 539-40.
97. Id. §§ 690-90.29.
98. Id. at § 537. Wages were exempted from attachment in response to McCal-
lop.
99. Id. § 690.50(i).
100. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
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ment from the clerk of the Sacramento County Municipal Court. The
marshal's office, pursuant to the writ of attachment, was instructed to
levy upon all monies held in the name of the Randones by a Fair Oaks,
California bank. Accordingly, the full $176.20 in the Randone's check-
ing account was attached, and withheld from them until the California
Supreme Court acted.
The Randones first filed a motion in the municipal court to dis-
solve the attachment fourteen days after it was levied. The grounds for
the motion were that the issuance of the writ before judgment consti-
tuted a taking without due process. They included an affidavit show-
ing that their sole source of income was unemployment insurance. The
court entered a ruling denying the motion to dissolve.
One week after filing with the municipal court, the Randones filed
a notice of appeal from that adverse ruling with the Appellate Depart-
ment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. After submission
of briefs and oral argument, the appellate court affirmed the lower
court's ruling without written opinion. A petition to the supreme court
for a writ of certiorari was referred to the Court of Appeal for the Third
District. The petition was denied, nearly eleven months after the Ran-
dones lost the use of the funds in their bank account. One month
later, the supreme court granted the Randones' second petition for a
writ of certiorari.
The supreme court in Randone, as in Blair, was unanimous in
finding that the Sniadach rationale was not limited to wages. Instead,
the court held that the Sniadach rationale applied generally to the
deprivation of property by prejudgment attachment, 1 ' and that the
question in Sniadach was not wages, but the "right to be heard."
The recent line of cases, commencing with Sniadach, reaffirms the
principle that an individual must be afforded notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant prop-
erty interest, and that exceptions to this principle can only be jus-
tified in "extraordinary circumstances.' 02
Probably the greatest hurdle for the Randones was the following
statement by Justice Douglas in Sniadach.
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in
general, see McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820, does not neces-
sarily satisfy due process in every case.
103
The authority to which Justice Douglas referred, McKay, was a 1929
101. 5 Cal. 3d at 547, 488 P.2d at 20, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 716. See also Jones Press
Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970), which ap-
plied Sniadach to garnishment of accounts receivable; Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d
712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969), which applied Sniadach to garnishment of bank accounts.
102. 5 Cal. 3d at 541, 488 P.2d at 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
103. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
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one sentence per curiam decision upholding a Maine Supreme Court
decision which found that a general prejudgment attachment statute
was not violative of due process because there was no "taking," but only
a temporary deprivation.' Fortunately for the Randones, the tenor of
Justice Douglas's opinion in Sniadach did not attempt to adopt McKay.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court had specifically found a "taking"
where Mrs. Sniadach was only temporarily deprived of her wages. If
Sniadach had followed the McKay reasoning, the result could have been
contrary to the one reached.' 0 5 In the McKay case, the court had re-
lied on two prior cases involving prejudgment remedies which did not
provide an opportunity for a prior hearing and had held that this was
not violative of procedural due process because the remedies were lim-
ited to "extraordinary situations" which presented a need for immedi-
ate action. Even were it to be contended that McKay has any prece-
dential value today, it would be limited to the extent of its authority;
that is, there may be extraordinary situations which warrant action be-
fore a hearing. In this respect, the McKay holding would not be in
conflict with the holding in Randone.
As in Blair, the Randone court found the failure on the part of the
legislature to narrowly confine the statutory language to extraordinary
situations fatal.' 01 The California statutory procedure provided that,
with the exception of wages, attachment could be had on any property
of the defendant, and that only after such attachment, and therefore af-
ter a certain amount of deprivation, could the defendant attempt to
avail himself of California's exemption statutes. °' Such an order of
procedure placed the burden of going forward on the defendant-
debtor, and the court could find no sufficient state or creditor interests
to justify such a general remedy.
Arguments which were raised in support of the summary attach-
ment procedures-that security for a possible judgment for the
creditor was a sufficient interest deserving of protection, and that the
credit industry would inevitably tighten credit requirements without
such summary remedies-were not found to present extraordinary situa-
tions.' Thus, without the sufficient state or creditor interests to war-
rant the delay of hearing, California's prejudgment attachment proce-
dure could not be justified. 1°9
Randone stated a "balancing" theory of due process:
104. See McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 116, 141 A. 699, 702 (1928).
105. Justice Harlan rejected the relevance of McKay altogether, 395 U.S. at
343-44 (concurring opinion).
106. 5 Cal. 3d at 552-53, 488 P.2d at 24, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
107. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
108. 5 Cal. 3d at 555, 488 P.2d at 25-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22.
109. Id. at 561-62, 488 P.2d at 32, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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What is due process depends on circumstances. It varies with the
subject matter and the necessities of the situation. 1 0
In other words, what amounted to an extraordinary situation in one
case, sufficient to waive the requirement of a hearing prior to a taking,
might not justify such waiver where the taking would cause significantly
greater hardship. Thus supported by its own theory of due process,
Randone held that there would be no extraordinary situations which
would warrant deprivation of the necessities of life prior to adjudication,
and therefore "all 'necessities' [will be deemed] exempt from prejudg-
ment attachment as an initial matter.""' The court further held that
in any case which involved the attachment of property not a necessity
of life to the debtor, but presumably excluding those cases in which the
deprivation is insignificant," 2 notice and a hearing on the probable
validity of the creditor's claim would be required in order to satisfy the
due process requirements-unless there are extraordinary circumstances
present." 3 Since any deprivation slight enough to be termed "de mini-
mis" would probably fail to justify the time and fees for filing to the
plaintiff, the effect of Randone, as a practical matter, is to: (1) pro-
hibit any attachment of the "necessities of life" of a defendant before
complete adjudiciation of the claim; (2) require prior notice and a
hearing before any attachment of nonnecessities except in extraordi-
nary circumstances.
Procedural Due Process in California:
A Limitation on Creditors' Rights
Justice Traynor, in 1958, wrote of the limits of due process:
When public necessity demands, there may be action followed
by a hearing. . . . Otherwise due process requires that no person
shall be deprived of a substantial right without notice and hearing. 14
That statement of principle has been given effect thirteen years later
by Blair and Randone. The cases together, based upon what would
appear to be a reasonable application of Sniadach and subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions," 5 hold that due process requires notice and a
hearing before the deprivation of any significant property interest, ex-
cept where state or creditor interests provide an extraordinary situation
requiring summary proceedings. This description of due process is not-
able, for by its terms, it is not limited to cases involving wages, or even
110. Id. at 558, 488 P.2d at 28, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 724, quoting Sokol v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 254, 418 P.2d 265, 270, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 678 (1966).
111. 5 Cal. 3d at 563, 488 P.2d at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
112. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
113. 5 Cal. 3d at 563, 488 P.2d at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
114. Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 672, 321 P.2d 9, 12 (1958).
115. See text accompanying notes 19-32 supra.
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"tremendous hardship." Since neither Blair nor Randone purported
to limit their principles to the strict facts of the cases, this definition of
due process must be the test for existing legislation, and the standard for
future legislation.
Obvious problems in assessing the precise limitations of procedural
due process in California are: (1) the imprecise nature of "extraordi-
nary situation"; (2) the nature of a "necessity"; and (3) the nature of
a hearing which will meet due process requirements.
The Extraordinary Situation
Some concept of the "extraordinary situation" will have to be in-
cluded in any future legislation to replace claim and delivery and pre-
judgment attachment. Sniadach cited four decisions exemplifying such
situations.116 Three of the cases involve a governmental entity clearly
acting in the public interest out of public necessity.
Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselbery, Inc."' held that where the
FDA Administrator found that a product was dangerous to health, or
fraudulently labeled, seizure prior to hearing would not violate due
process. In such a case, postponement of action pending a hearing
could clearly endanger public health, thus placing summary proceed-
ings within the public interest.
Similarly, Fahey v. Mallonee 8 and Coffin Brothers and Co. v.
Bennett..9 found that the public interest in preventing bank failures
was a sufficient interest to justify a summary replacement of bank man-
agement followed by hearings.
The case cited by Sniadach in demonstration of an "extraordinary
situation" was Ownbey v. Morgan.12  That decision held that because
attachment of a nonresident's property was the only means available
to the court to obtain jurisdiction, attachment of property for jurisdic-
tional purposes did not violate due process. 1
Several situations have been found not to be extraordinary situa-
tions. As noted, a state's interest in halting welfare payments to an
ineligible receipient is not sufficient to allow termination prior to a
hearing. 122  Nor is a plaintiff's interest in a tort action against an un-
insured motorist sufficient to justify the requirement of a security bond
116. 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
117. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
118. 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
119. 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
120. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
121. Id. at 111. This conclusion may be subject to attack, see text accompanying
notes 139-43 infra. The procedure in question also required the defendant to post a
bond if he appeared to defend.
122. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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by the defendant as the only alternative to suspension of his driver's li-
cense and vehicle registration pending a hearing on the claim.123 Simi-
larly, the -undocumented fear that a buyer will abscond or destroy prop-
erty sought in a replevin action is not sufficient, 124 nor is the alleged
public interest in easy credit, 25 nor the attempt to obtain security for
any possible subsequent judgment.
12 6
The "Necessities of Life"
There are obvious difficulties in attempting to enumerate property
which will qualify as "necessities of life," since what may be found to
be a necessity to one person, may not be so to another. The inherent
problem of attempting to alleviate extreme hardship by protecting
certain property of a debtor, litigant, or judgment debtor is apparent in
the voluminous and often amended California provisions for exemption
from attachment and execution.' 7  The intent in providing these ex-
emptions is clearly to protect one from the loss of what is "ordinarily
and reasonably necessary to . . . the debtor and his resident family.
: * ",1281 Because of the difficulty in making this sort of determination
in the abstract, each case would require a necessary showing and find-
ing in a hearing preliminary to attachment or seizure, that the property
sought was not "ordinarily and reasonably necessary" to the particular
person or family of the person whose possession is threatened.
Those items enumerated in present exemption statutes, with the
exception of wages, 2 ' even though they are "ordinarily and reason-
ably necessary" to the alleged debtor, become exempt only when the
debtor has invoked the appropriate exemption provision.3 0 In light of
Randone those items, because the legislature has implicitly found that
they are necessities, should be exempt from loss before final judgment
without any steps necessary by the debtor. Because an item not so
covered might also be a necessity, given the impossibility of legisla-
tion to encompass all possible situations, the debtor should have the op-
portunity to establish that his threatened property is a necessity before
the property is seized.' 3 '
123. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
124. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 278, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 56 (1971).
125. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 555, 488
P.2d 13, 25-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721-22 (1971).
126. Id.
127. CAL. CODE Cry. PRoc. §§ 690-90.29 (West Supp. 1971).
128. Id. § 690.1.
129. Id. § 690.6.
130. Id. § 690.50.
131. Randone noted the difficulty of drafting legislation which protects all
"necessities," and suggested that the present exemption statutes have not overcome that
difficulty. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 545-46, 488 P.2d 13, 18-19, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714-15 (1971).
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The Nature of the Requisite Hearing
As the preceding discussion of "extraordinary situations" has
shown, few debt actions are "extraordinary." In the great majority
of cases no extraordinary circumstances would be deemed present; how-
ever Sniadach, Blair, and Randone also require that the defendant be
given an opportunity to be heard before he can be deprived of any
significant interest. It does not appear that such an opportunity,
however, must always be extended to full adjudication on the merits.
Where the property sought to be attached or claimed is a "neces-
sity of life," that is, necessary "to live, to work, to support a debtor's
family or to litigate the pending action," the requisite hearing prior to
that loss cannot be less than full adjudication. 112  When property of a
less vital nature-nonnecessities-is sought, it would appear that the
requisite hearing need establish only the "probable," as opposed to "ac-
tual" validity of the underlying claim. 133 Such a procedure would not
put an undue burden upon the creditor whose claim is unimpeachable,
and would, at the same time, offer an alleged debtor with a meritorious
defense an opportunity to deny the probable validity of the creditor's
claim and thus force the creditor to prove the actual validity of his
claim before the debtor can be deprived of any property.
Legislation
New legislation for prejudgment claim and delivery and attach-
ment which would meet constitutional requirements was recognized as
possible in both Blair134 and Randone. 1 5  The following represents
a possible reorganization of claim and delivery and prejudgment attach-
ment statutory procedures which would meet the minimum standards
set forth in Blair and Randone.
A constitutional claim and delivery statute would require, under
search and seizure mandates, affidavits showing probable cause to be-
lieve that the defendant is in wrongful possession of property which is in
a particular place; such affidavits would have to be presented before a
magistrate, and not a sheriffs clerk. 13 6 In order to meet due process re-
quirements, prior to any seizure the defendant must be given notice
and a full opportunity to be heard, at least on the probable validity of the
132. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
133. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 562-63,
488 P.2d 13, 30-31, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 726-27 (1971); cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539-40 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-67 (1970).
134. 5 Cal. 3d at 284, 486 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
135. 5 Cal. 3d at 547, 488 P.2d at 19-20, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
136. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 273, 283, 486 P.2d 1242, 1253, 1260,
96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 53, 60 (1971).
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creditor's claim. 13 7  These requirements would be waived only where
the creditor can demonstrate an extraordinary situation requiring
immediate seizure such as proof that the debtor is about to abscond,
3 8
or where he can show a valid waiver by the debtor. 3 9 Moreover, if
the property is, at this preliminary stage, found to be a "necessity," it
could not be seized prior to complete adjudication.
140
A constitutional attachment statute would also require exemption
for the necessities of life from any prejudgment attachment.' 4 ' Notice
and a hearing would be required prior to any attachment, except where
probable cause could be demonstrated before a magistrate that an ex-
traordinary situation was present, requiring immediate action.142 Where
such probable cause is found, the defendant would still have to be af-
forded immediate opportunity to challenge the allegations and lift the
attachment. 43  A more limited approach, instead of becoming en-
tangled with the vagueness of "necessities," might restrict prejudgment
attachment to real property.'44 Such a scheme would provide security
for a possible judgment, and such attachment would not work a severe
hardship on the debtor, for his right to possession would not be dis-
turbed by the attachment. 145
Finally, existing legislation will have to meet the due process
standards of Blair and Randone; that is, except in extraordinary situ-
ations, a person must be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before
any significant deprivation. Certainly, in light of Blair, other repos-
session statutes must be enforced in consonance with the requirements
of search and seizure and due process protections. 46 Blair holds that
137. Id.
138. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 563,
488 P.2d 13, 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 727 (1971).
139. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 274-76, 281, 486 P.2d 1242, 1253-54,
1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 53-54, 58-59 (1971).
140. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 563, 488
P.2d 13, 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 727 (1971).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 563 n.29, 488 P.2d at 31 n.29, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727 n.29.
144. Note, Attachment in California: A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 1254, 1277 (1970); see Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court, 5
Cal. 3d 536, 544 n.4, 488 P.2d 13, 18 n.4, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 n.4 (1971). Pre-
judgment attachment of real property is currently provided for in CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc.
§ 542a (West 1954).
145. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 542(1), 542a (West Supp. 1971).
146. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1812.2 (West Supp. 1971) provides: "In the event of any
default by the buyer. . . under a contract or installment account, the holder, pursuant
to any rights granted therein... may retake the goods . . . ." CAL. COMM. CoDE
§ 9305 (West 1964) provides: "A security interest in . . . goods . . . may be per-
fected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral." While these statutes
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no "right" to repossession can be enforced without a hearing unless the
buyer waives his rights to that hearing. If a contract were to provide
for repossession, and the buyer did not voluntarily comply with the
clause, the waiver of the due process right to a hearing before reposses-
sion would only be effective if the contract was not one of adhesion-
the consent was freely, knowledgeably, and voluntarily given.
147
In light of Randone, other provisions of California's prejudgment
attachment statute must be examined. Section 537(4) of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure provides for attachment in "an action in
unlawful detainer where it appears . . . that rent is actually due and
payable . . ." While Blair and Randone dealt with the creditor-
debtor relationship, the Sniadach principles of due process have been
applied to landlord-tenant situations.14 Section 537(4) requires no
extraordinary circumstances to support a taking prior to a hearing, and
seems directly within the Blair-Randone rationale.
Sections 537(2) and 537(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure may
present the most notable fallout of the Randone decision. They provide
for attachment in actions in contract and tort, respectively, against a de-
fendant "not residing in this state, or who has departed from the state,
or who cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or who
conceals himself to avoid service of summons." Such attachments pro-
vide quasi in rem jurisdiction. 4 9  The need for that jurisdiction has
been held by Ownbey v. Morgan5 ' to be an extraordinary situation
presenting a sufficient state interest to justify postponement of hearing
until after attachment.' In discussing the Ownbey decision, the Ran-
are not directly affected by Blair, the manner in which they are invoked must meet the
procedural due process standards of Blair.
147. "[Wlhile we need not pass upon the validity of the consent purportedly ob-
tained under the contracts filed in this case . . .most of those contracts appear to be
adhesion contracts, the terms of which are specified by the seller or lender. 'The
weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop
around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a
monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His
contractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the
stronger party; terms whose consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if
at all.'" Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 275-76, 486 P.2d 1242, 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 54, quoting Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943). Thus it appears that where a buyer
"waives" his rights of due process contractually, such waiver will be ineffectual unless
the buyer exercised some choice in the matter, or received some quid pro quo.
148. See Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Gray v. Whitmore,
17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971); Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App.
3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970). These cases were all cited with approval in Blair v.
Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 486 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
149. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877).
150. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
151. See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
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done court distinguished it from other "extraordinary situation" deci-
sions in which rapid public action was necessary for the public
health and welfare.' 52 No analogous need, the court suggested, is any
longer involved in quasi in rem jurisdiction. 5 3  The court also cited
California's new jurisdictional statute in support of the contention
that the need for quasi in rem jurisdiction was now of lesser importance
in California than it was at the time of Ownbey (1921).151 In fact,
California's new jurisdictional statute' 55 makes in personam jurisdictional
requirements at least as broad in California as in any other state.156
While a defendant who hides to avoid service of process probably
does present an "extraordinary situation," it is at least arguable that
simple nonresidency, with nothing more, does not.157  Sections 537(2)
and 537(3) are now so broadly worded that even a defendant willing
to submit to personal jurisdiction in California can be deprived of his
California property without a prior hearing.
If, as in Ownbey, quasi in rem jurisdiction presented an extraordi-
nary situation because it was often the only means of obtaining jurisdic-
tion, then it should remain an extraordinary situation only where a
plaintiff cannot, under the liberalized laws of California, acquire per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. The strict requirement of Ran-
done that only extraordinary circumstances can justify a postponement
of hearing until after a taking supports this conclusion. A contrary po-
sition would allow a plaintiff in an action against a nonresident the lib-
erty of a taking without a prior hearing simply because he has the good
fortune to be suing a nonresident.
Conclusion
Blair and Randone have expanded a trend in California law which
has significantly altered creditor-debtor relationships. These decisions
have extended the Sniadach principles of procedural due process beyond
152. 5 Cal. 3d at 554, 488 P.2d at 24-25, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 721. See text ac-
companying notes 106-08 supra.
153. Id. at 554, 488 P.2d at 25, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
154. Id.
155. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (West Supp. 1971): "A court of this
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States."
156. Green, Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21 HASTiNGs LJ. 1219, 1241
(1970).
157. See, e.g., Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 942,
950-54 (1970); Note, Attachment and Garnishment-Constitutional Law-Due Process
of Law, 68 Micr. L. REV. 986, 1003-04 (1970); Note, Attachment in California: A
New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1254, 1262 (1970); see generally Carring-
ton, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1962).
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situations regarding only the loss of wages, and have effectively re-
moved summary prejudgment remedies which had provided great lever-
age to the creditor. The requirements of due process enunciated by
Blair and Randone assure that it will indeed be the extraordinary situa-
tion where a deprivation of property occurs prior to an opportunity for
a hearing. The ordinary situation will be characterized by a new equal-
ity of remedy after hearing.
Philip R. Bates*
